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ABSTRACT 
This paper reviews the restructuring of the Asia-Pacific iron ore market in the wake of the rise of the Chinese steel 
industry. Prior to the 2000s, this market was characterised by two key features – high firm-level concentration on both 
the producer and consumer sides, and price determination through annually negotiated benchmark pricing between 
Australian mining and Japanese steel firms. However, owing to rapid growth in the Chinese steel industry and its 
emergence as the region’s principal iron ore consumer, the Asia-Pacific iron ore market has been dramatically 
restructured during the last decade. This process has been accelerated since 2005 by Chinese governmental resource 
security  policies, which  have sought to address current record high iron ore prices through the use  of  foreign 
investment to sponsor new market entrants and the formation of an import cartel amongst the Chinese steel firms. 
This paper evaluates how these policies have driven restructuring in the Asia-Pacific iron ore market, through an 
analysis of the growth of China’s steel industry, Chinese resource security policies aimed at lowering iron ore import 
costs, and their effects upon the regional market’s ownership structure and price determination mechanisms. It argues 
that while Chinese investment and cartelisation policies have catalysed significant changes to the ownership and 
pricing structures of the Asia-Pacific iron ore market, they have carried only mixed benefits for the Chinese steel 
industry’s resource security.   2 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Asia-Pacific iron ore market is in flux. Since the first establishment of iron ore trade between Australia and Japan 
in the late 1960s, the regional market distinguished from other international mineral markets by two features – high 
degrees of firm-level concentration on both producer and consumer sides, and price determination through annually 
negotiated benchmark pricing. However, during the last decade these features have been dramatically transformed. 
Under conditions of booming demand due to surging Chinese imports, the region’s ‘Big-3’ iron ore producers (Vale, 
BHP Billiton and Rio Tinto) have been able to push for rapid price rises, which have increased nine-fold since 2000. 
These price rises have posed major cost-inflation pressures for the Chinese steel industry, and in response the Chinese 
government announced a series of ‘resource security’ measures to address soaring iron ore import prices in 2005. 
These policies aimed to restructure the regional iron ore market through: (a) the sponsorship of new mining projects 
through foreign investment; and (b) the cartelisation of Chinese steel firms in order to influence annual price 
negotiations. These Chinese policies have catalysed major changes in the regional market, diluting levels of 
ownership concentration on the producer side and resulting in the abandonment of negotiated pricing in favour of an 
index-based pricing model in early 2010. 
 
This paper examines these recent patterns of restructuring in the Asia-Pacific iron ore market. Following a review of 
the market’s structure prior to 2000, it examines how rising Chinese imports have driven price increases in the last 
decade, and reviews the resource security  policies that the Chinese government has deployed in an effort to 
ameliorate them. It then provides a detailed assessment of the effects of these Chinese policies on regional market 
structures, in terms of reductions in producer-side ownership concentration and the shift from negotiated to index-
based pricing mechanisms. Drawing on this analysis, it argues that Chinese resource security policies have achieved 
only mixed successes in their goal of restructuring the regional market in ways that improve the resource security of 
Chinese steel firms. The paper concludes by evaluating implications for the future operation of the Asia-Pacific iron 
ore market – demonstrating that while changes to pricing mechanisms have moved the market closer to that for other 
mineral commodities, high levels of ownership concentration are likely to remain despite Chinese efforts to sponsor 
new market entrants. 
 
2. HISTORICAL FEATURES OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC IRON ORE MARKET 
During the recent global resources boom, iron ore has been among the fastest growing mining sectors. Between 2000 
and 2009, world iron ore exports almost doubled in volume terms, from 478 to 935 million tonnes per annum (mtpa); 
and increased six-fold in value, from USD 9.2 billion to 55.6 billion (UN Comtrade, 2011). The majority is conducted as 
seaborne trade, and due to high transport costs the market is geographically segmented into two regions – with 
Atlantic-based trade connecting suppliers in Latin America and Africa to West European consumers, and a Pacific-
based trade linking Latin American, Australian and Indian producers to Northeast Asian consumers. While 
geographically distinct, prices in the two markets are linked due to the role of Latin American producers that supply 
both sets of consumers, which acts as a price transmission mechanism (European Commission, 2001: 32-34). However, 
the Asia-Pacific market has been the driving force behind recent growth in world iron ore trade. Asian iron ore 
imports tripled from 240 mtpa to 775 mtpa between 2000 and 2009 – largely due to booming demand from the 
Chinese steel industry – and the Asia-Pacific now accounts for over 80% of world iron ore trade (Table 1).   3 
 
Table 1 World iron ore imports by major steelmakers, 2000-2009 (mtpa) 
  Asia-Pacific 
Rest of World  World Total 
  Japan  Korea  China  Total 
2000  131.7  39.0  70.0  240.7  238.0  478.7 
2001  126.3  45.9  92.3  264.5  213.9  478.4 
2002  129.1  43.3  111.5  283.9  230.5  514.4 
2003  132.1  43.1  148.1  323.3  287.2  610.5 
2004  134.9  44.2  208.1  387.2  248.4  635.6 
2005  132.3  43.5  275.2  451.0  246.0  697.0 
2006  134.3  43.9  326.3  504.5  250.2  754.7 
2007  138.9  46.2  382.8  567.9  253.4  821.3 
2008  140.4  49.5  443.4  633.3  240.3  873.6 
2009  105.5  42.1  627.8  775.4  148.2  923.6 
Source: UN Comtrade (2011) 
 
 
Prior to the 2000s, the Asia-Pacific iron ore market had two features that distinguished it from other international 
minerals markets. The first was its ownership structure, which was characterised by high firm-level concentration on 
both the producer (mining) and consumer (steel) sides. On the supply side, the bulk of regional exports came from 
Australia and Brazil, which in 2000 supplied 74% of the Northeast Asia import market (UN Comtrade, 2011). Three 
firms, known as the ‘Big-3’ iron ore miners – Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (Vale) in Brazil, and Rio Tinto and BHP 
Billiton in Australia – accounted for almost all regional exports. Firm-level concentration was also pronounced on the 
consumer side, which was made up by the Japanese, Korean and Chinese steel industries. The Japanese industry was 
dominated by a group of five firms and Korea’s by one; though the Chinese steel sector was somewhat less 
concentrated, with its largest ten firms accounting for only half of national production in 2000 (CSY, 2001). There were 
also patterns of vertical integration between the steel and mining firms, with Japanese steel mills holding minority 
shares in several joint-venture projects run by BHP and Rio Tinto in Australia (BHP Billiton, 2009a; Rio Tinto 2009). 
 
The second distinguishing feature was the Asia-Pacific market’s sales and price determination mechanisms, which 
were unlike those for almost all other international minerals trade. Historically, sales volumes were regulated by long-
term contracts (LTCs) of five-  to ten-years duration between the steel and mining firms. First negotiated by the 
Japanese steel and Australian mining firms in the 1960s, these contracts served as a stabilisation device – providing 
long-term supply stability for the steel firms, and allowing mining firms to raise the necessary loans to finance project 
development costs (Rogers & Robertson, 1987). Price determination was also unique, and was based on the practice of 
negotiated annual benchmarks rather than spot market pricing. Initially developed during the 1970s, benchmark 
pricing took the form of an oligopoly-oligopsony negotiation between the Australian mining and Japanese steel firms. 
The two groups were respectively organised into informal cartels, with a representative firm from each side (typically 
Japan’s Nippon Steel and Australia’s Rio Tinto) acting as a ‘champion’ that would negotiate prices on behalf of the   4 
groups as a whole. These cartelised Australia-Japan negotiations then set an annual benchmark price at which all 
regional sales would be conducted (Sukagawa, 2010). This negotiated pricing system acted to stabilise regional iron 
ore prices, which remained relatively stable in nominal terms from the late 1980s onwards (Figure 1). LTCs and 
negotiated pricing also distinguished iron ore from most other international energy and minerals markets – such as oil 
and base metals – in which trade is conducted at arm’s length between firms, and price determination is market-based 
through either spot or index pricing systems.  
 
Figure 1 Asia-Pacific benchmark iron ore prices, 1979-2011 
 
Source: Author’s calculations, from UNCTAD (2011) and Table 3. 
 
3. THE RISE OF THE CHINESE STEEL INDUSTRY 
However, after nearly three decades of stable operation, the structure of the Asia-Pacific iron ore market has in the 
last decade entered a period of rapid reform. The primary cause has been the rapid growth of the Chinese steel 
industry, and its emergence as the region’s main buyer of iron ore. 
 
The origins of the contemporary Chinese steel industry date to the country’s liberalising economic reforms from 1978, 
which called for the gradual replacement of central planning with a ‘socialist market economy’ and set off a three-
decade period of industrialisation and high speed growth. However, given steel’s role as a critical industrial input, the 
state opted to maintain tighter control of the sector than it did for other industries. Privatisation was eschewed in 
favour of ongoing state ownership, and extensive subsidies were extended to promote the growth and modernisation 
of  the industry  (Taube & in der Heiden, 2009). State control of the industry was further reinforced by activist 
industrial policy interventions in the 2000s that offered state financial support to consolidate and nurture a group of 
top-ten state-owned steelmakers (Sun, 2007). Partly due to this supportive policy environment, and partly as a result 
of China entering a  ‘heavy’ phase of industrial development that saw rapidly increasing steel demand from the 
construction and machinery sectors, these Chinese steel industry has boomed over the last decade. Between 2001 and 
2009 Chinese crude steel production increased four-fold to 577 mtpa, and its share of world output rose from 18% to 
47% (WSA, various years).    5 
 
Rapid and state-supported growth saw the Chinese steel industry emerge as a major participant in the Asia-Pacific 
iron ore market from around the beginning of the 2000s. While China’s large coal reserves meant it has remained self-
sufficient for the supply of metallurgical coal, domestic sources of iron ore proved less reliable. The bulk of Chinese 
iron ore reserves are of a poor grade, technically difficult to exploit, and are located far from the major steel producing 
centres on the eastern seaboard (Labson et al., 1995). Chinese steel firms therefore turned to regional markets as its 
iron ore requirements grew during its period of high-speed growth. Chinese iron ore imports soared as a result – from 
70 mtpa in 2000 to 628 mtpa by 2009 – which tripled the size of the regional market and displaced the Japanese steel 
industry as the region’s primary consumer (Table 1).  
 
However, the Chinese steel mills’ institutional position in the regional market was qualitatively different from the 
Japanese mills they displaced. First, the Chinese joint ventures with the Big-3 mining firms were relatively small in 
comparison to those of the Japanese1
 
, meaning patterns of ownership  integration  with  their  main suppliers was 
relatively weak. Second, the Chinese mills lacked the institutional mechanisms for inter-firm cooperation during 
annual price negotiations that characterised the Japanese mills, and negotiated with the Big-3 suppliers individually 
rather than as a group. As the Chinese mills gradually replaced the Japanese as the region’s main buyers, there was no 
longer an informally organised import cartel capable of negotiating with the Big-3 miners collectively and on behalf of 
all the region’s steel firms. In the context of soaring demand, this lack of price leadership on the consumer side 
allowed the Big-3 to successfully press for extremely rapid price increases. Following the negotiation of an 
unprecedentedly large annual increase of 71% in April 2005 regional iron ore prices began a steady upward march, 
and by April 2011, Asia-Pacific benchmark prices peaked at USD 170 per tonne – a nine-fold increase on their levels 
only a decade earlier (Figure 1). 
By threatening their resource security – a situation where a consumer enjoys the continuous availability of needed raw 
materials at reasonable prices – these price increases have proven extremely problematic for Asian steelmakers. Soaring 
prices have posed heavy cost-inflation pressures, as slower growth in world steel prices has meant steel firms have 
been unable to fully pass input cost rises onto consumers. Driven by booming Chinese demand, world steel billet 
prices also grew during the last decade – setting an historical record of around USD 1100 a tonne in mid-2008, roughly 
four times their level in 2000 (OECD Steel Committee, 2009). However, steel prices then collapsed in the wake of the 
global financial crisis (GFC) beginning in September 2008, and by early 2011 had only recovered to half their pre-GFC 
levels (LME, 2011).  In comparison, regional iron ore prices have grown far more quickly and consistently than those 
for steel – reaching five times their 2000 levels by a peak in April 2008, falling only slightly during the GFC, before 
resuming growth again to double their pre-GFC peak by mid-2011 (Figure 1). As a result, steel mills in the region have 
suffered declining margins as increasing iron ore input costs have not been matched by equivalent steel price rises. 
 
4. CHINESE RESOURCE SECURITY POLICIES 
While iron ore cost inflation pressures posed a resource security problem for all Asian steelmakers, the Chinese 
industry was especially affected. Due to its comparatively lower technology levels than its Asian competitors, the 
                                                            
1 In 2008, the combined output of the Big-3’s iron ore joint ventures with Chinese mills was 30 mtpa; compared to 181 mtpa for those with Japanese 
firms. Author’s compilation, from BHP Billiton (2009a), Rio Tinto (2009b), Vale (2009).   6 
Chinese industry’s product mix is concentrated in lower value-added bulk steel lines for which raw materials make 
up a large proportion of final costs (OECD, 2006: 14). This exposes the Chinese sector to input prices more than its 
competitors, and as iron ore prices soared from 2005 carried extremely adverse effects on its profitability – with gross 
margins falling from a peak of 8.5% in 2004 to 2.2% by 2009 (CSY, 2010). By early 2009 the Chinese industry had 
begun describing itself as in crisis, which was officially attributed by both the industry and government to rising raw 
material costs (Steel Guru, 2009a). 
 
It was within this context that China launched its first resource security initiatives to address soaring iron ore prices in 
the middle of the 2000s. Given pervasive state ownership and control of the Chinese steel sector, it was the Chinese 
government that led and directed the industry’s response. Spurred into action by the 71% price increase in April 2005, 
the Chinese government issued an Iron and Steel Industry Development Policy in the middle of the year which included 
several elements to support the industry in the face of rising cost pressures (NDRC, 2005). As an industry-level 
initiative, the 2005 Steel Policy included a broad range of measures to improve the competitiveness of Chinese steel 
mills  – particularly through government-brokered mergers and state-financed technical upgrading projects (Taube & 
in der Heiden, 2009: 60-72). However, it also specifically aimed to address iron ore supply difficulties, by outlining 
two new policy measures that aimed to improve the industry’s iron ore supply security. These measures included: 
 
-  Sponsoring new iron ore suppliers – by encouraging steel firms to investment in iron ore projects overseas. This 
was assisted by the Chinese state-owned banking system, which was to provide steel mills loan finance on 
concessionary terms (NDRC, 2005: Article 30) 
-  Creation of a Chinese importers’ cartel  –  by promoting co-ordination between Chinese steel firms, with the 
intention of improving the industry’s bargaining position in annual benchmark price negotiations. This was 
assisted by the China Iron and Steel Association (CISA), which was delegated authority over the distribution 
of iron ore import licenses2
 
 (NDRC, 2005: Article 39). 
Fundamentally, these investment and cartelisation initiatives aimed to improve Chinese steel mills’ resource security 
by restructuring the Asia-Pacific iron ore market – by sponsoring new China-backed mining entrants that would 
dilute the market share of the Big-3 producers, and by creating a Chinese steelmakers’ cartel capable of challenging 
the Big-3’s market power in annual price negotiations. As a result of this government-sponsored program major 
changes have occurred to the ownership structure and price determination process in the regional iron ore market 
since 2005. However, the outcomes of this program have fallen short of its goals, and have carried only mixed benefits 
for the Chinese iron ore security. 
 
5. OWNERSHIP RESTRUCTURING AND CHINESE INVESTMENT INITIATIVES 
The first element of restructuring in the Asia-Pacific iron ore market –  changes to its producer-side ownership 
structure – has resulted from a rapid surge of Chinese investment in new iron ore projects. Given ready access to state 
financing Chinese firms embarked on an aggressive foreign investment strategy from 2005, the results of which are 
summarised in Table 2. Between 2000 and 2010, Chinese steel and mining firms invested in thirty-five overseas iron 
                                                            
2 This import licensing authority was not included in the 2005 Steel Policy itself, but was awarded to CISA soon thereafter in early 2006 (WTO, 
2006).   7 
ore projects, almost all occurring after state financial support was made available under the 2005 Steel Policy. The 
cumulative value of those for which data is publicly available is AUD 29 billion; and twenty-five of the investments 
(72% by value) were located in Australia. The majority of these investments have sponsored new entrants to the 
regional market through joint-venture packages, which have included Chinese firm taking minority equity stakes and 
offering long-term contracts to some thirty new iron ore exporters.   8 
Table 2 Chinese investments in overseas iron ore projects, 2000-2010. 
Firm  Project  Country  Date 
Equity 
acquired 
Value* 
Size (mtpa) and 
associated LTCs 
(% of output) 
Baosteel  BaoHI  Australia  2002  46%  NA  7.0 (100%) 
SOE Consortium  Wheelarra  Australia  2004  40%  NA  12.0 (100%) 
Rockcheck  Aurox  Australia  2007-08  12%  15  Plan 6.0 (100%) 
Ansteel 
Gindalbie  Australia  2007-09  36%  200  Parent company 
Karara JV  Australia  2007  50%  530  Plan 10.0 (100%) 
Tonghua I&S  Cairn Hill  Australia  2007-10  10%  14  Plan 1.4 (100%) 
Sinosteel  Midwest  Australia  2008  100%  1400  Plan 15.0 (100%) 
Sinosteel  Murchison  Australia  2008-09  6%  15  2.0 (None) 
Wugang 
Centrex  Australia  2008  15%  10  Parent company 
Eyre Iron JV  Australia  2008  40%  260  Plan 10.0 (80%) 
Shougang  Balmoral South  Australia  2008  13%  58  Plan 12.0 (100%) 
Jiangsu Shagang  Grange^  Australia  2008  45%  NA  2.5 (100%) 
Shougang  Mt Gibson  Australia  2008  40%  NA  Plan 9.0 (60%) 
CMG  Cape Lambert  Australia  2008  100%  400  Plan 15.0 (100%) 
Hunan Valin  Golden West  Australia  2008  11%  27  Exploration (45%) 
CITIC Pacific  SinoIron  Australia  2008  100%  560  Plan 27.6 (100%) 
China Western 
Mining 
FerrAus  Australia  2008  10%  21  Exploration 
Chinalco  Rio Tinto^  Australia  2008  9%  15500  217.0  
CNMIEC  Belinga  Gabon  2008  85%  955  Exploration 
Hunan Valin  Fortescue Metals  Australia  2009  15%  1200  40.0, Plan 150.0 (100%) 
Baotou   Bungalow  Australia  2009  50%  40  Plan 3.0 (33%) 
China Metallurgical 
Investment 
Beyondie  Australia  2009  50%  200  Exploration 
Chongqing Minerals 
Dev. 
Extension Hill  Australia  2009  60%  NA  3.0 (100%) 
China Railway 
Material Corp. 
FerrAus  Australia  2009  12%  13  Exploration (100%) 
Jinchuan Group  Fox Resources  Australia  2009  11%  18  Exploration 
Baosteel  Aquila  Australia  2009  15%  240  Plan 30.0 (50%) 
Shunde Rixin  Unnamed  Chile  2009  70%  NA  Exploration 
Wugang 
Consolidated 
Thompson^ 
Canada  2009  25%  360  8.0 (50%) 
Wugang  MMX^  Brazil  2009  21.50%  435  11.0, Plan 40.0 (50%) 
Sichuan Taifeng 
IMX  Australia  2010  20% 
47 
Parent company 
Cairn Hill JV  Australia  2010  49%  Plan 1.4 (100%) 
Huaxi  Lincoln  Australia  2010  13%  8  Plan 2.0 (50%) 
China Railway 
Materials Corp  African Minerals  Sierra Leone  2010 
12.50%  280 
Plan 45.0 (80%) 
Shandong  25%  275 
CIF  Kalia  Guinea  2010  NA  2914  Development (100%) 
ECE  Itaminas^  Brazil  2010  100%  1316  3.0 (100%) 
Wugang  Bong  Liberia  2010  60%  75  Exploration 
Chinalco  Simandou  Guinea  2010  47%  1481  Plan 95.0 
Subtotal to Australia        20776   
Subtotal to Others        8091   
Total        28867 
Planned new capacity: 425 
mtpa 
* For comparison, investment values are converted to AUD millions at then-current exchange rates 
^ Indicates an existing enterprise. All other investments are in new ventures. 
Source: Adapted from Wilson (2011) and various media sources    9 
Several goals motivated this Chinese investment program. A first, stressed in official Chinese statements on the 
program, has been to increase regional iron ore supply by providing finance and LTCs to new export projects (see 
Zhang, 2009). However, diluting the ownership position of the Big-3 firms through the sponsorship of new suppliers 
was also a goal of the program. This was to be achieved by the development of ‘captive mines’ that were tied to the 
Chinese market through LTCs and minority ownership stakes, which the Chinese government and industry intended 
would provide a strategic foothold in the regional iron ore market and lessen the market power of the Big-3 firms 
(Wilson, 2011). For example, Baosteel claimed its 2009 investment in Aquila Resources would “strengthen Baosteel's 
control over strategic resources [and] weaken the monopolistic grip over global iron ore supplies and lower purchasing costs” 
(Reuters, 2009).  Moreover, in March 2011 the China Mining Association officially described the investment program 
as aimed at ‘breaking the monopoly’ of the Big-3 producers (China Daily, 2011), leaving little doubt that a 
restructuring of regional ownership arrangements was also a central objective of the investment program. 
 
In addition to sponsorship for new suppliers, the goal of gaining a strategic foothold in the regional iron ore market 
was also evident in a series of investments made by Chinalco in Rio Tinto soon after the Chinese investment program 
was announced. A first, undertaken in February 2008, saw Chinalco make a government-funded ‘dawn raid’ on 9% of 
Rio Tinto’s shares in order to block an attempted takeover of the company by BHP Billiton that would further 
concentrate the regional iron ore market (Leaver & Ungerer, 2010). A second investment was proposed in February 
2009, under which Chinalco would acquire a further 9% of the company but gain marketing rights to 30% of the 
output of Rio’s Hamersley operations (Rio Tinto, 2009a). While this second investment was ultimately abandoned due 
to both shareholder and governmental concerns in Australia, it highlights how Chinese firms have attempted to 
strategically use investments to gain control over regional iron ore supplies. 
 
However, an analysis of the results of the Chinese investment program show that it has achieved only mixed success 
in restructuring regional ownership arrangements. Its principal achievement has been to sponsor some thirty new 
China-backed entrants to the regional market – a dramatic change to the market’s ownership structure, which before 
2005 was almost wholly dominated by the Big-3 firms. This program is still in its infancy in terms of increasing 
regional iron ore supply – as of early-2012, only five3
 
 of the thirty China-sponsored projects have made production, 
with most planning to become operational between 2012 and 2015. Nonetheless, as the projects gradually proceed to 
production over the next five years, they will make a significant addition to the regional market, as the combined 
planned output of the eighteen projects that have given estimates of their development plans is approximately 425 
mtpa, the majority  of which is tied through LTCs to their Chinese investors (Table 2). This is equivalent to 
approximately half the current regional market and two-thirds of China’s 2009 import needs, and will go some way 
toward satiating the Chinese steel industry’s soaring iron ore requirements. 
However, the extent to which these new projects will dilute the ownership position of the Big-3 miners in coming 
years is limited, due to issues regarding their  prospective  economic viability. First, while large in size when 
considered together, most of the Chinese-sponsored joint-ventures are individually quite small. With the exception of 
a few medium-sized projects (Fortescue Metals, MMX, African Minerals and Simandou), the bulk of the sponsored 
projects are planning for between 5 and 15 mtpa of production. In comparison to the Big-3 – whose size in 2009 
                                                            
3 Fortescue Metals, Wheelarra, BaoHI, Murchison and Extension Hill.   10 
ranged from 140 mtpa (BHP) to 250 mtpa (Vale) – these projects are extremely small, and in the heavily scale-reliant 
iron ore industry are unlikely to be cost-competitive. Second, many of the new projects will require costly transport 
and shipping infrastructure to be constructed before commencing exports. This is proving particularly difficult in the 
new Midwest region of Australia, where infrastructure development work is currently at a halt due to financing 
difficulties faced by Oakajee Port and Rail, the region’s joint-venture infrastructure provider  (Sydney Morning 
Herald, 2011).  Furthermore, many of these projects have faced significant cost blowouts since their first 
announcement (Sydney Morning Herald, 2012), which has forced their Chinese backers to pay a ‘supply security 
premium’ – in the form of increased investment commitments – to guarantee their continued development4
 
. As a 
result of their small size and comparatively high costs, it is unlikely most of these projects will be cost-competitive 
with the Big-3 incumbents. 
Conditions of tight supply and record iron ore prices are at present justifying these high cost projects, but it is unlikely 
that this situation will continue in coming years. As of 2010, the Big-3 producers have themselves committed to 
expansion plans that would see their combined output increase by 450 mtpa by 20155
  
 – approximately the same scale 
as the China-sponsored entrants’ development plans. These expansions will limit the extent to which the Big-3’s 
market share declines as a result of new entrants. Big-3 capacity increased will further ameliorate the current pattern 
of extremely tight supply, and may moderate regional iron ore prices in the process. It is likely that the poor cost-
competitiveness of the new market entrants will make many unviable under a future scenario of reduced prices and 
market-share competition with the rapidly expanding Big-3, and will necessitate that their Chinese sponsors pay 
further supply security premiums to ensure they proceed to production. Of course, the issue of future price trends 
will depend on the future balance between Chinese steel production and regional iron ore supply. Presently, the 
nature of this balance is a debated question – with some forecasters predicting that regional prices will fall only 
slightly on current levels due to strong Chinese domestic demand for steel (The Age, 2011), while others point to the 
aggressive capacity expansion plans to suggest a rebalancing of supply and demand that will see prices fall by half by 
the middle of the next decade (Australian, 2011a). Nonetheless, it remains an open question as to whether the majority 
of the thirty new China-backed iron ore entrants will ultimately succeed in moving from development to production 
over the coming years. 
6. PRICE DETERMINATION AND CHINESE CARTELISATION INITIATIVES 
Alongside  restructuring ownership arrangements, the Chinese government’s resource security policies have also 
driven major changes to pricing mechanisms in the Asia-Pacific iron ore market. The catalyst for change came during 
the annual benchmark negotiations of April 2005, when Vale and Japan’s Nippon Steel struck a deal for a 71.5% 
increase – a rise unprecedented in the history of the negotiations. Considered catastrophic in China, the result was 
blamed on the fact the deal was settled by the Japanese firms, whose declining share of regional imports meant it had 
now become ineffective at negotiating on behalf of the regional steelmakers as a whole (Caijing, 2005). In response, a 
number of Chinese governmental policies were announced that sought to establish a Chinese iron ore importers’ 
cartel that could substitute for the Japanese in annual negotiations. In March, the Chinese Ministry of Commerce 
                                                            
4  This parallels a similar strategy used by Chinese oil companies in their recent acquisitions abroad, where Chinese firms have paid higher 
investment prices for projects on the ‘competitive fringe’ of the oil and gas industry in order to gain a foothold in the world market (Moran, 2010). 
5 Author’s calculations, from BHP Billiton (2009a), Rio Tinto (2009b), Vale (2009).   11 
announced an iron ore import licensing system, under which the China Iron and Steel Association (CISA) – a private 
industry association run by the Chinese steel mills –  was empowered to distribute and enforce iron ore import 
licenses (WTO, 2006). CISA was then formally granted industry coordination powers by the government in July under 
the 2005 Steel Policy, with the specific goal of strengthening “self-discipline” amongst the Chinese mills in price 
negotiations. Baosteel, the largest Chinese steel firm, was appointed as the industry’s ‘champion’ negotiator, with 
CISA promising to support Baosteel in this role by using its import licensing powers to prevent any other Chinese 
mills from participating in the negotiations (China Daily, 2006). Initially, the officially stated goal of these policies was 
only to “stabilise” raw materials prices (NDRC, 2005: Article 30). However, by 2008 CISA was explicitly describing the 
program  as aimed at cartelisation,  claiming its purposes was to achieve a “united front” amongst  the  Chinese 
importers (Steel Guru, 2008). 
 
Chinese cartelisation policies had an immediate effect on price negotiations, and between 2006 and 2008 achieved 
several successes in challenging the pricing power of the Big-3. In 2006, the Japanese mills abstained from the talks, 
leaving price negotiation to Baosteel and CISA’s government-backed cartel. The resulting negotiations were arduous, 
and when a deal was ultimately settled between Rio Tinto and Baosteel some eleven weeks after the April deadline, 
the unexpectedly low result of a 19% rise was widely considered to have resulted from the Chinese cartelisation 
policies (Dow Jones, 2006). In 2007, the Chinese cartel was able to split the Big-3 during negotiations – with Baosteel 
and Vale agreeing to another below-expectation rise of 9.5% in December 2006 before negotiations had officially 
begun, which BHP and Rio Tinto were then forced to reluctantly accept (Australian, 2008a). In February 2008, Baosteel 
again made an early deal with Vale for a 65% price rise, well below a demand for a 140% rise made by the two 
Australian firms. BHP and Rio Tinto initially refused to accept the 2007 Baosteel-Vale agreement, and threatened to 
boycott spot market sales to China in order to try and force a better deal (Australian, 2008b). However, they only 
proved able to extract an agreement for a 79% rise from Baosteel in July (Australian, 2008c) – a price much closer to 
original Chinese demand, which resulted in two regional benchmark prices (Brazil-Asia and Australia-Asia) rather 
than one. Thus, by late 2008 the state-backed Chinese iron ore import cartel had transitioned into the role of 
representing regional steelmakers in annual price negotiations, and had successfully balanced against the pricing 
power of the Big-3 miners by splitting the mining firms during price talks. 
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Table 3 Asia-Pacific iron ore benchmark price settlements, 2001-2011 
Date  Settling parties 
Reference price*  
(USD per tonne)  
Change 
Apr-01  BHP/Rio Tinto – Nippon  18.5  4.0% 
Apr-02  BHP/Rio Tinto – Nippon  18.1  -2.4% 
Apr-03  BHP/Rio Tinto – Nippon  19.7  9.0% 
Apr-04  BHP/Rio Tinto – Nippon  23.0  16.7% 
Apr-05  Vale – Nippon  39.5  71.5% 
Apr-06  Rio Tinto – Baosteel  47.0  19.0% 
Apr-07  Vale – Baosteel  51.5  9.5% 
Apr-08 
Brazil – All: Vale – Baosteel   84.9  65.0% 
Aust – All: Rio Tinto – Baosteel  92.6  79.9% 
Apr-09 
All – Japan: Rio Tinto– Nippon  62.1  -32.9% 
All – China: No agreement     
Apr-10 
Quarterly index 
124.0  99.7% 
Jul-10  151.2  22.0% 
Oct-10  131.6  -13.0% 
Jan-11  141.7  7.7% 
Apr-11  170.0  20.0% 
Jul-11  164.9  -3.0% 
Oct-11  162.1  -1.7% 
Source: Author’s compilation, from (The Australian, 2010b, 2011b; Platts, 2010; Reuters 2010, 2011b, 2011c; Rio Tinto, 
2011; Steel Guru, 2010). 
* Reference prices are calculated as the free-on-board price of 64% iron ore fines from Rio Tinto’s Hamersley 
operations. 
 
With annual negotiations becoming increasingly fraught, a major clash broke out between the two sides in 2009 as a 
result of intensified efforts by the mining firms to resist the Chinese cartel. Having paid the price of disunity in 2007 
and 2008, the Big-3 took a more coordinated approach into the 2009 negotiations, jointly proposed a radical new 
‘index pricing’ formula which would see the benchmark for LTC sales set with reference to regional spot market 
prices rather than through negotiation (Bloomberg, 2009a). Intent on protecting the negotiated pricing (upon which 
their cartel depended), CISA refused to agree to the Big-3’s index pricing proposal; and in the context of the then-
current GFC also demanded that 2009 prices should fall by 45% back to their 2007 level.  
 
The conflict between the competing pricing models of the Big-3 and the Chinese mills proved so intractable that by 
negotiation deadline in April no agreement was  reached. Fearful that negotiations would collapse entirely, the 
Japanese steel mills broke ranks with the Chinese cartel and settled with the mining firms in May for a 33% reduction, 
albeit without the index pricing model that had been proposed (Australian,  2009).  In turn, CISA responded  by 
threatening a Chinese import boycott against Big-3 in an attempt to force a deeper price cut. However, when this 
threat failed to split the mining firms, many of the smaller Chinese steel mills began making purchases from the Big-3 
on a spot market basis, seriously compromising the Chinese negotiating position (Steel Guru, 2009b). CISA attempted 
to revoke the small mills’ import licenses to restore discipline to the cartel; but this proposal was overruled by the 
Chinese Ministry of Commerce (from which its import licensing powers were legally delegated) on the grounds that 
cutting off the small mills’ iron ore imports would seriously harm the industry, at the time exceedingly fragile due to 
the effects of the GFC (China Daily, 2009).  
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Before a formal settlement could be reached, the 2009 negotiations were then interrupted by a major political scandal. 
On July 5, the Shanghai Public Security Bureau arrested four members of Rio Tinto’s negotiating team on charges of 
bribing Chinese steel mills to provide inside information on the Chinese position during price talks (Bloomberg, 
2009b). The arrests, which became known as the ‘Stern Hu Affair’6
 
, proved extremely contentious. The Chinese 
government’s handling of the arrest was less than transparent and drew official criticism from the US and Australian 
governments, and doubts were also raised over the authenticity of the evidence brought against the group during 
trials that were only partially open to outside observers. Rumours (founded or otherwise) began to circulate the 
arrests were a Chinese attempt to intervene in the price negotiations; though the Chinese government defended the 
veracity of the allegations against the group and rejected the suggestion that the arrests were in any way politically 
motivated (Australian, 2010a; Sydney Morning Herald, 2009). For its part, Rio Tinto initially denied the allegations 
made against the group, but when they each pleaded guilty to bribery charges during trials in March 2010 was forced 
to publicly accept their guilt and terminate their employment (Rio Tinto, 2009c, 2010). The immediate effect of the 
arrests was the total collapse of the 2009 talks, and no regional benchmark was agreed for the first time in the three-
decade history of the price negotiations. 
The Stern Hu Affair became the catalyst for a dramatic change to regional iron ore pricing arrangements in 2010. 
Having decided that negotiations had become too politically fraught to be viable, in February 2010 the Big-3 firms 
declared they would no longer participate in price negotiations. Instead, they jointly proposed a ‘quarterly index’ 
system, which would see benchmark prices for LTC sales change quarterly, in line with average iron ore spot market 
prices during the previous quarter7
 
. With annual negotiations having now entirely broken down due to the mining 
firms’ jointly refusing to participate, CISA was forced to allow Chinese mills to import using the quarterly index 
pricing system in February (China Daily, 2010), bringing to an end the Chinese iron ore import cartel. Given then-
current spot prices, the adoption of quarterly index pricing resulted in a 99.7% price rise in its first quarter of 
operation alone (Table 3), an unprecedentedly large increase even in the context of the preceding five years.  
Since April 2010, all the involved parties have officially adopted the quarterly index as the price determination 
mechanism for the Asia-Pacific iron ore market. The Big-3 miners have defended the system as being more 
transparent than the negotiated benchmark (BHP Billiton, 2009b), and argued that it reflects maturation in the 
regional iron ore market towards a more market-based pricing system (Vale, 2010). In practice, however, quarterly 
index pricing has so far favoured the mining companies – both by delivering further price increases (with the index 
continuing to rise before stabilising just over USD 160 in mid-2011), as well as definitively ending the scope for the 
cartelisation efforts sponsored by the Chinese government. Recognising the latter consequence, CISA has since 
abandoned the cartelisation program entirely, and replaced it two new iron ore pricing strategies. First, in July 2010 
CISA announced a new import diversification program to challenge the market power of the Big-3, under which it 
intends to reduce China’s iron ore import dependence on the Big-3 producers to only one-third of its total 
consumption by 2015, with the difference to be replaced by increased imports from the new market entrants being 
sponsored under the Chinese investment program (Bloomberg, 2010). This was followed in February 2011 by a CISA 
                                                            
6 Named after the head of the Rio Tinto negotiating team, who was the only Australian national amongst the group. 
7 See statements by BHP (Mining Weekly, 2010a), Rio Tinto (Mining Weekly, 2010b) and Vale (Dow Jones, 2010).   14 
plan that encouraged Chinese steel firms to build iron ore stockpiles, which it argued could be strategically released in 
order to prevent rapid price rises and “guard against monopoly from global mining companies” (China Daily, 2011a). 
 
Whether Chinese steel mills will be able to use iron ore stockpiles to strategically manipulate regional iron ore prices 
in the coming years is a matter of debate. During 2011, Chinese steel mills increased their iron ore stockpiles by a third 
(to around 100 million tonnes, or two months of imports) (Bloomberg 2012); which Leaver (2011: 385) has suggested 
could potentially act as a “market-breaking weapon” under the new quarterly index system. However, as of early 2012 
there has been no evidence of Chinese firms using stockpiles to manipulate regional prices, and whether such a tactic 
could succeed is an open question. In order to use stockpiles to manipulate spot market prices, Chinese steel mills 
would need to coordinate their individual purchasing activities to ensure the simultaneous release of stocks, which 
would  presumably  occur  under CISA’s leadership. However, given CISA’s failure to effectively organise cartel 
activities its ability to orchestrate such a strategy is arguably weak at present. It may also invoke retaliation from the 
mining firms, and as the experience of the 2009 and 2010 price negotiations demonstrates the Big-3 have increasingly 
and effectively managed to collectively in dealing with Chinese cartel operations. 
 
Conversely, the strategy of diversifying imports away from the Big-3 through a reinvigorated investment program 
could  potentially  prove workable  for the Chinese steel industry. Based on the most recent official Chinese steel 
production figures (2009), the new CISA investment plan would require obtaining approximately 300 mtpa of iron ore 
from the Big-3, and a further 600 mtpa of ‘direct shipping ore’ (DSO) (or its equivalent) from other sources (CSY, 
2010). Given Chinese domestic output is around 250 mtpa of DSO-equivalent production, and that some 425 mtpa of 
additional capacity is currently planned by the new China-sponsored projects, this diversification goal is achievable 
so long as Chinese steel and iron ore production are maintained at roughly their current levels and the new projects 
make it to market.  
 
Nonetheless, and as noted before, the success of the new China-sponsored projects will crucially depend on future 
price levels. If record-high prices moderate as planned additional supply comes onto the market – 425 mtpa from the 
new entrants and 450 mtpa from the Big-3 – many of the less cost-competitive new projects will be unable to match 
the prices offered by the incumbents. This will necessitate Chinese investors to make even greater financial 
commitments to their sponsored projects (potentially also in the form of increased export prices) to ensure they 
remain in the market. While financial assistance from state banks at least makes it possible for Chinese investors to 
pay such supply security premiums, whether they will choose to do so also remains an open question. It is possible 
that under a scenario of significantly reduced prices it may become attractive for Chinese steel firms to abandon 
import diversification and continue to rely primarily on the lower-cost Big-3 firms. Much therefore depends on future 
price trends, which suggests that from the Chinese perspective import diversification is essentially a hedging strategy. 
If loosening supply does price out many of the new market entrants, the high prices rationalising the payment of 
supply security premiums to the new projects will largely be obviated; whereas if prices remain high the new projects 
will be a critical component of ongoing resource security efforts to diversify supply away from the Big-3 producers. 
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7. OUTCOMES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ASIA-PACIFIC IRON ORE MARKET 
As this analysis has shown, Chinese governmental resource security policies have driven rapid change in the Asia-
Pacific iron ore market during the last decade. However, while Chinese investment promotion and cartelisation 
efforts have carried significant effects for the structure of the regional market, in terms of improving the resource 
security of the Chinese steel industry the program has at best delivered mixed results. 
 
The most significant change has been to regional iron ore price determination mechanisms. As soaring Chinese 
demand drove rapid price rises and undermined the Japanese mills’ effectiveness as price negotiators, the Chinese 
industry deployed state-led cartelisation efforts from 2005 in an attempt to reinstate a representative cartel on the 
steelmakers side of negotiations. However, Chinese attempts to moderate price rises through cartelisation have 
largely failed. Despite some success in its early years between 2006 and 2008, the increased assertiveness of the Big-3, 
combined with the politically controversial arrests of the Rio Tinto negotiating team, terminally compromised the 
Chinese cartel in 2009. Moreover, the response of the Big-3 to these cartelisation efforts has been to force the 
abandonment of annual benchmark negotiation entirely in 2010 in favour of a market-based quarterly index system, 
which has (thus far) ended the scope for Chinese cartel actions. The Chinese cartelisation initiative also did little to 
arrest price increases, which have increased four-fold since their announcement in 2005 and are presently at record 
levels. Overall, cartelisation has largely failed to improve the Chinese resource security in terms of either stabilising or 
reducing iron ore import prices. 
 
The broader implication of the shift from negotiated to index-based pricing is that iron ore is coming to be priced like 
other internationally traded mineral commodities for the first time. While a benchmark price still exists for LTC sales 
in the form of the quarterly index (unlike the daily spot quotes used to price minerals on the London Metals 
Exchange), quarterly indexing is nonetheless a major step towards the transparent and market-based pricing systems 
used for most other mineral commodities. Indeed, as of mid-2011 there are currently efforts from both BHP and Rio 
Tinto for a move to a monthly- rather than quarterly-based index (Reuters, 2011a) which, if successful, would move 
iron ore pricing a further step closer to other minerals. Most importantly, the shift to index pricing has removed 
political factors – such as the degree of coordination between steel and mining firms, and the pricing power this 
confers – from regional price determination, which now occurs on the basis of supply and demand balances reflected 
in transparent spot price movements. As Sukugawa has recently suggested, iron ore is in the process of joining the 
“commodity club” for the first time (2010: 62). 
 
Changes to the ownership structure of the Asia-Pacific iron ore market have been less dramatic than those for its price 
determination arrangements, but somewhat more successful from the Chinese perspective. On the one hand, 
producer-side ownership has become less concentrated as a result of Chinese governmental investment promotion 
policies to sponsor new regional suppliers. Some thirty new entrants to the Asia-Pacific iron ore market have received 
Chinese sponsorship, which collectively intend to add at least 425 mtpa of new supply to regional markets over the 
coming five years. This marks a major change in producer-side ownership from the situation in 2005, when the Big-3 
producers faced few competitors and dominated the regional market. If these new entrants can successfully proceed 
from the development to production stage, they will also add a sizeable portion of additional capacity to the Asia-  16 
Pacific market. This will go some way toward restoring balance between regional demand and supply, and improve 
the Chinese mills’ resource security in terms of the availability of iron ore supply. 
 
However, it is less likely that these new projects will ultimately dilute the ownership position of the Big-3 as the 
Chinese investment program has intended. As few are yet to enter production, the degree to which these new entrants 
have restructured producer-side ownership has so far been negligible. Moreover, whether all (or most) of these new 
entrants will actually enter the regional market in the coming years is an open question, as the majority are unlikely to 
be cost-competitive with the Big-3. The Big-3 are also aggressively expanding their operations, and the massive 
volume of new supply (around 875 mtpa) that both groups plan to add to the market can be expected to at least 
moderate the recent trend toward record iron ore prices. The degree to which regional prices will fall is currently 
debated, but nonetheless raises questions over whether the new China-sponsored entrants will be able to survive 
market-share competition with the Big-3, and whether Chinese investors will continue to pay supply security 
premiums to ensure their survival. Thus, while the sponsorship of new entrants will assist Chinese resource security 
by increasing regional iron ore supply in the coming years, only minimal reductions in producer-side concentration 
has either yet occurred or can be expected. The ultimate extent of diversification in ownership will depend upon 
future price trends and Chinese willingness to sponsor new market entrants, both of which suggest that expectations 
for a shift away from Big-3 dominance should at best be modest. 
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